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Abstract: We question the behavioral premise underlying Ainslie’s claims
about hyperbolic discounting theory. The alleged evidence for humans can
be easily explained as an artefact of experimental procedures that do not
control for the credibility of payment over different time horizons. In ap-
propriately controlled and financially motivated settings, human behavior
is consistent with conventional exponential preferences.
Ainslie’s (2001) book, Breakdown of Will, is based on hyperbolic
discounting theory. This theory predicts that the individual could
behave in a dynamically inconsistent manner, by holding and act-
ing on preferences at one point in time that contradict the pref-
erences of the same individual at a later date. However, before
worrying about ways that the individual could address possible dy-
namic inconsistencies, we need to be sure that the behavioral
premise is valid.
A critical design feature in the empirical literature on hyper-
bolic discounting is the use of a time delay to the early payment
option in order to control for any confounding effects from fixed
premia due to transactions costs. The use of this front end delay
(FED) means that one cannot differentiate between “quasi-hy-
perbolic preferences” and “exponential preferences,” and we do
not believe that any credible design can do so.
Ainslie concludes his discussion of the empirical evidence on
hyperbolic discounting with the following passage:
There is extensive evidence that both people and lower animals spon-
taneously value future vents in inverse proportion to their expected de-
lays. The resulting hyperbolic discount curve is seen over all time
ranges, from seconds to decades. Because a hyperbolic curve is more
bowed than the exponential curve that most utility theories go by, it de-
scribes a preference pattern that these theories would call irrational: It
predicts temporary preferences for the poorer but earlier of the two al-
ternative goals during the time right before the poorer alternative be-
comes available. (Ainslie 2001, p. 47)
This passage confounds three things. The first is whether the dis-
count rate varies with the length of the time horizon over which it
is being elicited, such as it does with continuously hyperbolic pref-
erences. The second is whether the discount rate for a given hori-
zon and elicited with a FED is different than the discount rate for
the same horizon and elicited with no FED. For an experimenter,
and for subjects evaluating the credibility of being paid, these are
very different questions. The potential importance of this distinc-
tion seems to have been first noticed by Benzion et al. (1989).1 It
was also highlighted by Roberts (1991, p. 344), in the context of
comments on Ainslie and Haendel (1983) and Winston and Wood-
bury (1991). The third issue is whether nonexponential prefer-
ences imply dynamic inconsistency when one relaxes the restric-
tive assumption of temporally separable preferences (Machina
1989; McClennan 1990).
The FED design was introduced into discount rate experiments
to address concerns about differential credibility. Although it may
not completely solve the potential credibility problem, it arguably
mitigates it. The FED also serves to equalize any other unspeci-
fied differences subjects may perceive between the two payment
options. For example, if subjects have a “passion for the present,”
they demand a premium in order to accept a delay of any length.
In a choice between immediate payment and delayed payment,
this premium is attached only to the delayed payment. Thus, the
subject is being asked to compare “good apples today” with “bad
apples tomorrow,” confounding the discount rate with the credi-
bility of receiving the commodity. However, if both payments are
delayed, the premium applies to both choices and thus becomes
irrelevant to a choice between them. Harrison et al. (2002) used a
FED in a major field experiment in Denmark, and found that
elicited discount rates are proximately invariant with respect to
horizon.
There are, however, many field settings in which the relevant
issue is what the discount rate is for “money today” versus “money
in the future.”2 Even if the experimenter faces the inferential
problem of having to then tease apart the effects of time horizon
from credibility, transactions, or other subjective costs, it is en-
tirely appropriate that experiments with no FED be considered.
If there is a finding that discount rates are not constant when there
is no FED, then it is a matter for interpretation as to whether this
is a subjective differential cost effect or a time-inconsistency ef-
fect (or both).
Evidence for the behavioral importance of a 30-day FED was
provided by Coller and Williams (1999). In one of their experi-
mental treatments they had no such delay, and the results from
those experiments can be directly compared to their other exper-
iments. After some minor modifications to their statistical analy-
sis, Coller and Williams’s results provide evidence that the use of
a FED decreases elicited rates by a large amount. The average ef-
fect of having no FED is to increase elicited rates by 28 percent-
age points, with a 95% confidence interval between 52 percent-
age points and 3 percentage points. Coller et al. (2003) provide
additional laboratory evidence on the role of the FED, and show
that a 7-day FED is sufficient to overcome the effects of subjec-
tive transactions costs.
Finally, there have been no direct tests of the implication of dy-
namically inconsistent choice behavior using real rewards. Such
longitudinal tests require that one allow for possible changes in
the states of nature that the subject faces, since they may confound
any in-sample comparisons of discount rate functions at different
points in time. Harrison et al. (2005) have reported the results of
a large-scale panel experiment undertaken in the field to examine
this issue and found evidence strikingly consistent with dynamic
consistency.
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NOTES
1. Holcomb and Nelson (1992) reexamined the role of a FED with
monetary payoffs, motivated by a concern that Benzion et al. (1989) only
studied hypothetical choices. Their FED was only one day long, so it is not
obvious that the subjects viewed this as substantially different from there
being no FED. They observed no apparent effect of the one-day FED on
behavior.
2. Such settings might include individual decisions of whether to con-
sume now or save for future consumption, or to purchase a more expen-
sive but energy efficient appliance. We believe that individual decisions in-
volving more significant sums of money or public policy decisions are
better characterized as having a FED.
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Abstract: I propose to complement Ainslie’s idea of “bargaining with your
future selves” with that of “shaping your past selves.” The result of such a
complementation is that an action can work in two ways: (1) as a prede-
cent for future behavior and (2) as a shaper of past behavior. I argue that
this diminishes the unwanted effects of hyperbolic discounting even fur-
ther.
Weakness of will, or akrasia, comes in two different forms. Broad,
apparent, or diachronic akrasia covers cases where an agent fails
Commentary/Ainslie: Précis of Breakdown of Will
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